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Abstract
In recent years, “smart city” has become a buzzword in discussions about urbanisation. While 
in Europe and North America the initial utopian optimism has now receded, due to booming 
implementation costs and surveillance concerns, the smart city model has taken root in rapidly 
urbanising Asia in particular, thanks to the activism of China and Japan. For the latter, smart 
city technologies and technical know-how represent the new frontier of export goods. In April 
2018, the Government of Japan and that of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam announced the 
construction of a new smart city on the outskirts of the Vietnamese capital Hanoi that is set to 
become Japan’s largest ODA project to date. Despite changes in the global hegemonic narra-
tives on smart cities, the new project bears the features of an urban settlement that revolves 
around technological data collection for the sake of perfect efficiency, rather than for its pro-
spective inhabitants. Against this backdrop, how did the Government of Japan succeed in con-
structing a convincing narrative for made-in-Japan smart cities? Since 2011, thanks to specific 
initiatives by Japan’s government and investments by Japanese tech companies in the sector, a 
Japanese discourse on smart cities has emerged. Through an examination of earlier critiques of 
the smart city model and a close analysis of official policies and books by energy policy intellec-
tuals, this paper will identify the main features of the Japanese discourse on smart cities and 
place it in the context of an evolving broader global narrative. The study demonstrates how the 
Japanese discourse on smart cities largely reflects a corporate managerial vision of the city and, 
at the same time, a “technonationalist” approach that informs the country’s foreign policy.
Keywords: Japan, smart cities, information and communication technologies (ICT), energy 
diplomacy, foreign policy, technonationalism, discourse 
1. Introduction
In recent years “smart city” programmes and initiatives have appeared across 
the world. While in Europe and North America the initial utopian optimism 
seems now to have succumbed to booming implementation costs and over-
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whelming surveillance concerns,1 the smart-city paradigm has taken root in 
East Asia especially, thanks to the activism of China and Japan.2 In particular, 
the latter has fostered cooperation agreements with other regional actors on 
smart-city projects. For an export-dependent country such as Japan, smart-
city technologies and technical know-how represent the new frontier of ex-
port goods. In April 2018, the government of Japan (GOJ) and that of the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam (Vietnam, hereafter) announced the construc-
tion of a new smart city on the outskirts of the Vietnamese capital Hanoi, 
which is set to become Japan’s largest Official Development Assistance (ODA) 
project to date.3 A few months later, during Japanese Prime Minister Abe 
Shinzō’s visit to Beijing in October 2018, China and Japan agreed to cooper-
ate on a number of infrastructural projects including a “smart city” in Chon-
buri province in Thailand, not far from the capital Bangkok.
In light of these facts, the concept of machi-dzukuri (“city building”), 
which has been at the centre of Japan’s international cooperation activities 
since the 1980s (JICA 2008), has acquired new significance. Despite the rela-
tive loss of their world-market share in core sectors for smart-city construc-
tion, such as electronics, heavy industries and car manufacturing, Japanese 
companies have been able to advance their technologies and know-how 
abroad, while profiting from tax cuts and subsidies domestically, along with 
incentivised urbanisation schemes and foreign aid abroad (Berndt 2018). As 
the above-mentioned smart-city projects show, however, despite a fundamen-
tal lack of clarity regarding the very definition of “smart city” (Joss et al. 
2019), this public-private coalition has been successful in building a specific 
narrative reflected in government policy papers, statements, state-sponsored 
events and essays. Against this backdrop, this paper will address the following 
research questions: What kind of ideas and concepts are associated with the 
smart city in Japanese discourse? What kinds of models has the GOJ built and 
presented, at least at the level of public narratives, to project a convincing story?
Thus far, a consistent part of the academic literature on the “smart city” 
has struggled to provide a definition of the concept itself, though it commonly 
highlights the importance of technology in the attempt to improve the city- 
1 See e.g., Greenfield 2012, 2013; Poole 2014; Sterling 2018; City of Boston 2019.
2 Since 2011, following the approval of the 12th Five-Year Plan aiming at reducing carbon emissions by 
17 percent per unit of GDP by 2015, China has launched dozens of smart-city projects. China is today the 
country with the highest number of pilot projects (Tokoro 2016).
3 According to the Nihon Keizai Shimbun (2018), the project has an estimated value of 37 billion dollars. 
It entered its first phase in late 2018 after the Vietnamese government granted permission for foreign invest-
ments and it is due to be completed in 2023. It is being designed by Nikken Seikei and will feature 7000 
condo facilities and commercial activities. The smart town mobility system will be managed by self-driving 
buses and charging stations for electronic vehicles provided by Mitsubishi. All houses will be furnished 
with solar panels and food waste recycling equipment, smart appliances for energy conservation and smart 
meters, supplied by Panasonic and KDDI, to gauge energy consumption. Daikin Industries will supply air 
conditioning in the complex. Japanese group Aeon will open groceries and supermarkets in the area. In 
addition, 3000 cherry trees will be planted in green areas.
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dwellers’ quality of life.4 More recently, scholars have focused on global nar-
ratives and discourses regarding the smart city. In his review of smart-city 
projects around the world, Tokoro (2016) identifies a dozen keywords such as 
“smart grid”, “recyclable energy”, “urban development/redevelopment”, “next- 
generation transport system” and “environment protection” (Tokoro 2016: 3). 
At the same time, authors such as Greenfield (2012, 2017), Townsend (2013) 
and Holland (2015) have problematised the role of major global tech compa-
nies in the diffusion of the smart-city model, contending that this transition 
has led to the privatisation of public goods and spaces. Linked to this critique 
is the argument, based on a close analysis of official documents issued by 
regional organisations such as the European Union, that points to a funda-
mental absence in smart-city projects of a bottom-up citizen-centred perspec-
tive (De Waal / Dignum 2017, Engelbert et al. 2019) and attention to social 
issues such as social inequality and urban violence (Gonella et al. 2019). Spe-
cifically in the Japanese case, DeWit (2014, 2015 and 2018) clearly shows the 
revolutionary potential of the GOJ’s smart city and smart community pro-
gramme in terms of the decentralisation of Japan’s energy sector and the revit- 
alisation of local economies (cf. in particular DeWit 2014), while still under-
scoring the lack of citizen participation in government-sponsored smart-city 
projects in Japan (DeWit 2013, Samuels 2013).
2. Historical “disjunctures” and the rise of discourse coalitions
In light of recent developments in Japan’s international cooperation regarding 
smart-city projects in developing Asia, it is worth analysing how this idea has 
been discursively framed by relevant policymaking actors in recent years. It is 
assumed that this articulation has taken place in response to a critical juncture 
in Japan’s recent history: the 11 March 2011 tsunami and Fukushima nuclear 
disaster, the adoption of the UN Sustainable Development Goals framework 
and the signing of the Paris Agreement in 2015. The first event was instrumen-
tal in re-orienting Japanese domestic policies in the field of energy and envir- 
onment. The second historical phase has been crucial to enriching existing 
policies with new, and possibly more attractive, ideas and concepts.
At the basis of this assumption is the belief that specific historical pro- 
cesses, events, crises and “disjunctures” are a key part of the development of 
specific hegemonic narratives at the national and transnational levels (see 
Jessop / Sum 2013: 130, Samuels 2013). The Cultural Political Economy 
(CPE) approach developed by Jessop and Sum provides a suitable approach in 
4 See Mahiznan 1999, Caragliu et al. 2009, Washburn et al. 2010, Guan 2012, Nam / Pardo 2012, 
Albino et al. 2015.
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this sense, as it focuses on the correspondence between “imaginaries” and 
“real material forces in the existing international political economy”. At the 
foundation of this approach is the idea that economic systems and the relative 
set of regulatory political institutions are not the product of mere rational-
ism (economism). Rather, they are the product of social relations that emerge 
from specific institutional arrangements and historical as well as geographical 
conditions (Jessop / Sum 2006a: 4). In fact, what matters here is “the inter-
action between the discursive and extra-discursive that gives relatively suc-
cessful economic and political imaginaries their performative, constitutive 
force in the material world” (ibid.: 158). Consequently, any shift at the level 
of discourse reflects a shift in the “material apparatuses” and “social prac-
tices” consolidated in a given context, e.g., that of global neoliberalism. 
In addition, the CPE approach stresses that hegemonic narratives are the 
product of a multi-scalar process of adaptation and negotiation among “ac-
tors with different horizons of action” (global, national, regional, etc.). In this 
process, the role of “sub-hegemonic nodes” is fundamental. These are the ac-
tors developing appropriate “technologies of power” that “anchor” globally 
hegemonic discourse to a regional or local level, and which might even con-
tribute bottom-up to the emergence of new discourses. Their success depends 
on their ability to “absorb alternative meanings and marginalise resistances”, 
and therefore on their capacity to “adapt to more global or local circumstances” 
(Jessop / Sum 2006b). 
In particular, this study aims to analyse the emergence of epistemic commu-
nities or “discourse coalitions”, i.e., groups of actors sharing a common def- 
inition for “ambiguous social circumstances” and trying to impose their views 
on others through diverse means, including “manipulation and the exercise of 
power” (Hajer 1993: 45). In the case study presented here, the smart city is 
interpreted as a storyline around which different actors (governments and 
private companies) formed a coalition in order to impose a certain “view of 
reality”, and at the same time, to advance their specific interests by suggesting 
new social practices and arrangements. In particular, this ideational conver-
gence revolves around the idea of a “technological nation”, valorised as such 
after a series of a traumatic events (the disaster of March 2011), that is based 
upon a “romantic interpretation of history” that nonetheless guides the for-
mulation of public policies (Charland 1986: 197). From a policymaking per-
spective, this projection of a national identity is arguably necessary in the 
attempt to establish a (sub)hegemony.
Through a review of public documents and the Japanese literature, this 
paper will shed light on the discursive interactions between the policymaking 
arena and a number of energy-policy intellectuals and examine how the smart-
city model has been framed as a “storyline” able to provide a solution to a 
specific issue or a number of issues. Specifically, the entry point for this re-
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search is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (hereafter, MOFA) set of 
policies labelled “energy diplomacy”. An analysis of these policies is present-
ed in the final part of the paper. Energy is among the top MOFA priorities, 
given the ministry’s task to contribute to national security through diplomacy 
and international cooperation. Assuming the existence of a network of en-
trenched relations among ministries and government agencies, this paper aims 
at describing the Government of Japan (GOJ)’s energy policy shifts in the last 
decade and the agency of experts and energy intellectuals, particularly after 
the historical disjuncture of March 2011. To this end, we have conducted a 
content analysis of the work of influential energy experts and GOJ energy and 
innovation strategies before and after the Fukushima nuclear incident. Focus-
ing on keywords and recurrent themes, the study underscores paradigm shifts 
(albeit partial) in the public and official discourse on energy and environmen-
tal sustainability, and, consequently, the inclusion of such themes in foreign 
policy. 
3. A new imaginary of the city
In 2018, 4.2 billion people lived in cities – approximately 55% of the total 
world population. By 2050 the ratio will increase to 68%. Today 70% of 
global wealth is produced in cities. However, urban areas are also responsible 
for more than half of total global energy consumption and waste production, 
with dramatic consequences for the natural environment (Van Beurden et al. 
2019). 
In its effort to promote sustainable development and tackle the current en-
vironmental crisis, particularly after the launch of the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals (SDG) in 2015, the UN has integrated the concept of “smart city” 
into its policy guidelines regarding urban development. Since the United Na-
tions Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development (Habitat 
III) held in Quito in October 2016 and the adoption of a New Urban Agenda,
the concept of “smart” has been consistently associated with that of “sustain-
able”. However, despite the general vagueness of this new model of urbanisa-
tion, official definitions stress the importance of the use of information and 
communication technologies (ICT) to make urban spaces more efficient, and 
also economically, socially and environmentally sustainable, in an attempt to 
increase the quality of life of present and future city-dwellers.5 
Such a shift toward an “efficient” and citizen/customer-oriented idea of city 
testifies to the emergence of a new imaginary, and its relative narrative, about 
5 See for example the definition provided by the Focus Group on Smart and Sustainable Cities of the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), a specialised agency under the UN Economic and Social 
Council (ITU FG-SSC, UN  2015).
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cities in the second half of the 2000s. Particularly after the 2008 global finan-
cial and banking crisis, a wave of financial austerity in large parts of the global 
North led city administrators to direct efforts toward the attraction of global 
private capital, resorting in certain cases to the privatisation and corporatisa-
tion of public urban spaces (Hollands 2015).6 
Like other major developed economies, the Japanese government adopted 
the smart-city model as part of its energy and environment strategies in the 
last decade for very practical reasons. The March 2011 disaster was certainly 
a “crucial disjuncture” in this transition (Samuels 2013). According to one 
definition provided by the GOJ, a Smart city is 
a sustainable city or region where issues intrinsic to urban areas are managed (planned, 
prepared, managed and run) using new technologies such as the ICTs. At the same 
time, it is a city or region where overall optimisation of the city activities is devised. 
(MLIT 2018)
In addition to renewable energy sources, a smart city is fundamentally data- 
driven and employs cutting edge information technologies in view of “the 
realisation of efficient management and deployment of the city infrastructures 
and services, while improving the residents’ quality of life” (MIC 2018).7 
Ideally, such a city is the hub for the creation of new products and services 
that may contribute to growth of the local economy.
To date, more than 104 smart city/smart community projects are ongoing 
in Japan (CO 2019). The majority of them (63) are implemented by the Cabi-
net Office’s Bureau for the Promotion of Overcoming Population Decline and 
Vitalising Local Economy under the scheme for the implementation of a “near 
future technology-based society” (kinmirai gijutsu shakai). This programme, 
inspired by the UN SDGs, aims to enhance the use of ICTs (Internet of Things, 
5G connectivity, self-driving vehicles, etc.) to solve local issues with the sup-
port of ad hoc regulations (CO 2019).8 The Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communication (MIC) is in charge of 35 other projects which are more strictly 
focused on ICT deployment for data collection and analysis to improve resi-
6 Citing growing public mistrust against governments all over the world, IBM, for example, maintains 
the need for the public sector to “embrace new technology, processes, ideas, and workforce skills” in order 
to better respond to the citizens’ needs and demands as efficiently as private companies (IBM 2019). Such a 
marketing strategy has been relatively successful. Hollands, for instance, estimates that between 2009 and 
2013, IBM generated 3 billion dollars from its smarter city initiative (Hollands 2015: 69). Tech companies 
have also shown particular flexibility in adapting their offer to emerging issues such as migration and bor-
der control, climate change and natural disasters.  
7 As clearly illustrated by DeWit (2015), the GOJ does not adopt a singular definition of the smart city, 
rather it adopts a multifaceted description resulting from various government agencies’ involvement in the 
identification and implementation of smart-city projects. However, the resemblance of such descriptions to 
those provided by major tech companies is evident. More comprehensive definitions are offered by private 
companies such as Mitsubishi Electric that stress the importance of low carbon sustainable power sources 
along with the provision of consumer-oriented control devices for maximum energy saving and emergency 
responsiveness (Mitsubishi Electric 2019). 
8 Projects managed under this scheme also comprise the so-called “environment cities” (kankyō shīti), 
“environment model cities” (kankyō mōderu shīti) or “SDG model cities” (CO 2019).
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dents’ quality of life. This scheme includes cities such as Kashiwa, Sapporo 
and Takamatsu, where ICT has been deployed in disaster prevention (systems 
of sensors for early warnings) and tourism (bike sharing systems). The Minis-
try of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), on the other hand, is the front-
runner in projects aimed at using ICTs for a better and more efficient manage-
ment of energy, with a stronger focus on the business sector. The METI has 
sponsored projects aimed at promoting the use of renewable energy and at the 
creation of local energy management systems (EMS) in residential areas (such 
as in the Kashiwa no ha project or in Senju, in Tokyo) and energy cogenera-
tion in commercial and business districts (Nishishinjuku), educational institu-
tions (Chūbu University) and manufacturing areas (Ohira) (METI n.d.). 
The Abe government has since incorporated the concept of smart urbanisa-
tion into its national growth strategy aimed at realising a “Society 5.0”, i.e., a 
“super smart society” (PMO 2017). According to the strategy, the extensive 
employment of ICT for data collection and use in diverse sectors, ranging 
from car manufacturing to logistics to infrastructure building and manage-
ment, is key to enhancing Japanese cities’ and companies’ competitiveness 
worldwide. In 2018, the Cabinet Office launched an expert commission aimed 
at the promotion of the concept of the “super city”, which is conceived as an 
evolution of the data-driven smart city, where e-government is enhanced, 
e-learning is implemented in schools and services, such as public transport and 
garbage collection, are automated (PMO 2018).
4. Rethinking energy grids in Japan: Pre-3/11 state-led efforts
The earthquake and tsunami that hit the Tōhoku region on 11 March 2011 
(3/11) prompted the GOJ to adopt policies and technologies in an attempt to 
enhance the resilience of urban communities and infrastructures against the 
possibility of a natural disaster of major proportions. The 2011 natural disas-
ter and nuclear accident represented a “critical juncture” in contemporary 
Japanese history, as they provided the grounds for new narratives to arise in 
view of the substantial political, economic and social changes (Kingston 2012, 
Samuels 2013). That of the smart community, or smart city, is an elucidatory 
case. It shows in fact that the emergence of certain discourses and the rise of 
relative discourse coalitions – groups of individuals sharing the same social 
construct identified as a “problem” and, thus, the same storyline regarding the 
problem itself and possible solutions – has accelerated. In addition, it shows 
how little impact the differences in the political orientation of successive cab-
inets have had against the backdrop of a hegemonising global narrative. 
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Given Japan’s structural lack of primary energy sources and its vulnerabil-
ity to natural disasters, government bureaucrats had been struggling to find 
solutions to ensure energy security and to enhance the country’s overall resili- 
ence to global energy crises, natural disasters and climate change well before 
the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami (DeWit 2015). In the aftermath of 
WWII, the Japanese power generation sector was re-organised into regional 
monopolies subject to state supervision.9 Power generation was initially 
achieved with a combination of large, slowly operating hydroelectric power 
plants covering baseload consumption needs and more rapid coal-fired ther-
mal power plants to accommodate peaks of consumption. This model suffered 
structural distress during the high economic growth period in the 1960s, lead-
ing to the construction of new cost-efficient oil-fired thermal and nuclear power 
plants. In rural areas, government subsidies fostered local acceptance of large-
scale energy facilities that mainly served distant metropolises and industrial 
parks (Berndt 2018: 131–139). 
The oil crises of the 1970s prompted Japanese policymakers to rethink the 
country’s policies in securing energy sources, but did not really affect the 
GOJ’s industrial policy of plant and heavy machinery construction. Between 
the early 1970s and early 1990s, the GOJ started investing in energy conser-
vation technologies and nurtured the domestic nuclear industry in view of its 
future export potential (ibid.: 144). The nuclear industry would remain cen-
tral in the GOJ’s energy strategies aimed at stabilising the country’s energy 
supply at least until 2010. 
With the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol in response to the new interna-
tional concern about climate change, the Japanese government enacted a spe-
cific law on global warming (chikyū ondanka taisaku no suishin suru hōritsu) 
in 1998. The legislation and its successive amendments set a 6% greenhouse 
gas emissions reduction target by 2008–2012 and urged domestic appliances 
and car manufacturers to adopt world-class energy efficiency standards. It 
also stipulated that local governments throughout the archipelago were re-
sponsible for limiting greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and finding viable 
countermeasures in accordance with their respective areas’ “natural and so-
cial conditions” (Sugiyama / Takeuchi 2008: 425–26). Despite the relatively 
limited authority conceded by the national government to prefectures, munici- 
palities, towns and villages on climate change, local government initiatives in 
this regard started appearing in the early 2000s. The launch of initiatives aimed 
at reducing carbon emissions by encouraging the public to use mass transpor-
tation services was accompanied by the establishment of specific regulations 
(in the case of Tokyo and Kyoto in the mid-2000s) requiring companies and 
9 I.e., the state is responsible for setting the electricity price.
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businesses to adopt environmental management systems and energy efficiency 
measures (ibid.: 431–32). 
The 2005 Aichi Expo, whose concept revolved around the relationship be-
tween man and nature, was an occasion for the display of Japanese com panies’ 
achievements in public transportation and power generation and distribution 
technologies, as well as examples of public-private collaboration in curbing 
carbon emissions. Among the Japanese companies involved, Toyota Group 
took centre stage. The world’s top carmaker presented its efforts in the devel-
opment of hybrid vehicles (specifically buses) and hydrogen technology for 
engine fuel supply and their practical applications in Toyota City, a town of 
420,000 people located nearby the Toyota plants. At the same time, an ad-hoc 
power generation plant installed near the exhibition grounds by a consortium 
of nine companies including Toyota, Kyocera, NTT, Mitsubishi Heavy and 
Chūbu Electric, the regional power utility, supplied electricity and heating, 
generated through a mix of renewable energy sources (fuel cells powered by 
biogas and solar panels), to the pavilions. The power supply system was de-
signed by a team of engineers coordinated by Kashiwagi Takao, Professor at 
the Tokyo Institute of Technology and one of the leading Japanese “energy 
intellectuals” of the last two decades (Kashiwagi 2011, DeWit 2014).
Initiatives at the local level remained key to attaining environmental policy 
targets even after the Aichi Expo. In 2008, the conservative Fukuda cabinet 
announced that Japan would cut by 80 per cent its GHG emissions by 2050 
through investments in the latest nuclear power generation and carbon cap-
ture technologies. In order to encourage local governments to participate in 
the national strategy, Fukuda launched a contest for the best ecologically sus-
tainable cities, which resulted in the nomination of a dozen “environmental 
model cities” (kankyō moderu toshi) and their CO2 emissions reduction plans 
(Sugiyama and Takeuchi 2008: 428–29). 
Such a state-led model area strategy for GHG reduction continued under 
the successive reformist DPJ10-led cabinets. Starting in late 2009, Tokyo iden-
tified four Test Projects for Next Generation Energy and Social Systems, i.e., 
smart cities and communities. If certain projects (Toyota, Keihanna and Kita-
kyūshū) were mere continuations of previous initiatives (such as the “environ-
mental model cities”), others started from scratch (Yokohama). Each project 
was developed in collaboration with at least one key actor in the energy, 
infrastructure and tech sectors, such as Toshiba, Toyota, Mitsubishi Heavy 
and IBM Japan (Samuels 2013: 145). The smart-community model, based on 
an energy distribution model structured around a network of small-scale 
power distribution systems (smart grids), came to be seen as a more secure 
and potentially more resilient alternative to large centralised power distribu-
10 Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ).
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tion systems.11 All the more so, if one considers the absence of connections to 
macro regional power distribution systems and the internal differences between 
Eastern and Western Japan, as opposed to the regional connections or even 
nationally integrated energy networks found in Europe. Concomitantly, a 
more compact and infrastructurally efficient model of urbanisation centred on 
the smart grid might help the national and local governments to tackle press-
ing issues such as ageing and depopulation (DeWit 2018).
Reformist sections of the METI bureaucracy were thus moving toward nur-
turing an alternative energy sector, aware of its export potential in the near 
future. The Government of Japan also created a specific budget (amounting to 
126.5 billion yen) through which the METI and its New Energy Promotion 
Council (NEPC), established in 2008, could subsidise future projects in sus-
tainable urban development (Pham 2014: 21–24). Table 1 summarises the con-
trasting views on power generation and supply, within the METI, before and 
after the Kyoto Protocol.
Table 1: Pre- and Post-Kyoto Protocol views on power generation within the METI 
  Pre-Kyoto Protocol Dominant Model   Post-Kyoto Protocol Alternatives
  large-scale infrastructure   small-scale infrastructure
  region-specific supply network   integrated network (possibly inter- 
  regional and international)
  constant baseload   demand-based baseload supply
  urban-rural divide   local generation and consumption
11 For a detailed discussion of Japan’s power generation industry and its links to national and local poli-
tics and policymaking, see Berndt 2018.
Source: compiled by Marco Zappa
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5. The DPJ New Growth Strategy and 
    the emergence of the “radical thinkers”
In 2010, the DPJ-led GOJ issued a New Growth Strategy12 emphasising the 
role of “green innovation” in the attempt to revitalise the national economy 
and to contribute to solving global issues. The 2010 strategy stressed the im-
portance of enhancing Japan’s strengths (such as the country’s longest life ex-
pectancy, its scientific and technological advancement) to gain global leader-
ship in the energy and environment sectors.
Priority areas were: spreading and expanding renewable energy sources 
along with nuclear power; developing innovative technologies for energy con-
servation, efficient power supply and material recycling; promoting a shift to-
ward a low-carbon lifestyle, expanding eco-housing and transforming energy 
consumption habits through the adoption of new lighting technologies (such 
as LEDs and electroluminescent displays); promoting urban renewal and rede-
velopment through deregulation and green incentives; and creating eco-friendly 
and self-supporting local communities through the enhancement of ecologic ally 
sustainable infrastructures and mobility networks supporting local economies 
based on the environment, healthcare and tourism (PMO 2010: 15–17). 
In this way, advancing “green innovation” through a comprehensive policy 
package would lead to a reduction in Japan’s GHG emissions by 25 per cent 
by 2020 and create a 50-trillion-yen market and 1.4 million new jobs. Globally, 
this would curb 1.3 billion tonnes of CO2. In this effort, a collaboration be-
tween the public and private sector (kanmin ittai) was crucial. According to 
the strategy, in addition to implementing green innovation, to achieve a strong 
economy Japan needed to look toward Asia. With many regions in Asia con-
fronting challenges such as urbanisation, environmental decay, falling birth-
rates and rapid ageing, Japan needed to be able to meet the demand for trans-
port and energy infrastructure, waterworks, healthcare services and goods, 
green technologies and, broadly, know-how, to further sustain the country’s 
economic growth in the coming decades. It is worth noting that terms like 
“innovation” (inobēshon) and “energy” (enerugī) occur far more frequently 
(52 and 48 times, respectively) throughout the New Growth Strategy than 
unemployment (shitsugyō) and poverty (hinkon) (12 and 1).13 
12 The Japanese version of the strategy document carries a subtitle that reads: “recovery scenarios toward 
a healthy Japan” (Genkina Nihon fukkatsu shinario). The rhetoric of the lost two decades is present in this 
document. In fact, the strategy affirms that in order to achieve a “healthy Japan”, a new growth strategy 
was required in order to break with the past and with the old-school pork barrel politics conducted by the 
LDP.
13 Even though the document is not specifically focused on smart cities, this result is in line with the find-
ings of the analysis carried out by Gonella et al. (2019) on European Commission documents and with the 
technocratic argument put forward, among others, by Greenfield (2017).
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Besides national and local government endeavours in drafting new energy 
policies, the late 2000s saw the emergence of prominent individuals advocat-
ing a large-scale paradigm shift in Japan’s energy policies. As argued by DeWit 
(2014), “radical technocrats”, like the above-mentioned Kashiwagi Takao, 
have been able to exert some influence on the public debate and, eventually, 
thanks to what could be defined as a form of “technonationalism”, on actual 
policymaking. For instance, the largely technocratic tone of the 2010 New 
Growth Strategy is reminiscent of one of Kashiwagi’s most influential works, 
published a few months after the release of the New Growth Strategy and 
dedicated to the Smart Revolution (sumāto kaikaku) (Kashiwagi 2010). In the 
introductory note to the book, which praises the affiliation of both former 
PMs Hatoyama and Kan with the Tokyo Institute of Technology (the first as 
former researcher, the latter as alumnus), the institution where Kashiwagi 
himself teaches, the engineering professor offers an optimistic look at the re-
gime change (seiken kōtai) that ousted the LDP from power and might put the 
Japanese economy back on track. He praises the DPJ’s earlier initiatives re-
garding the economy and environment, hoping that DPJ leaders will be able to 
affirm the supremacy of politics to win over the bureaucrats’ cooperation in 
the name of “national interest” (kokueki) without falling into LDP-style log-
rolling.
Further on, the Tokyo Institute of Technology professor argues for a grad-
ual energy paradigm shift that would not only contribute to the achievement 
of the ambitious CO2 reduction goals set by the GOJ, but would also create 
new business opportunities and jobs leading to the revitalisation of the Japa-
nese economy. One of the key elements in this transition is the spread of 
“smart grids”, i.e., ICT-based decentralised power supply networks enabling 
the integration of diverse natural energy sources and a demand-based energy 
supply. Technological innovations of this sort could spur international co- 
operation with preeminent international partners, such as the US and Europe, 
thus contributing to the establishment of new international standards based 
on Japanese technology and avoiding international isolation (i.e., the “Galapa-
gos” effect; Kashiwagi 2010: 19, 186).14 Kashiwagi also adds that many devel-
oping countries in Asia, such as China and India, have already started or will 
soon start looking at Japan for solutions to issues such as decarbonisation, 
energy supply optimisation and countermeasures against an ageing society. In 
particular, China is expected to complete its transition from emerging country 
to advanced economy in the next few decades, and will possibly turn to Japan 
for clean technologies (including nuclear power generation) and human re-
source development in the energy and environment sectors (Kashiwagi 2010: 
71, 186). 
14 Page numbers for this book refer to the electronic edition of the text as available on Honto e-reader in 
full-screen visualisation.
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6. The immediate post-3/11 technonationalistic solutions 
However, it was in the aftermath of the 2011 nuclear accident that new energy 
generation and supply models became more popular. Following the meltdown 
of three reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant, the GOJ opted for a 
phase-out of all 54 of the country’s commercial nuclear reactors. This decision 
would lead to a drop of almost 20 per cent in Japan’s power generation cap- 
acity. Against this backdrop, the GOJ took steps towards reducing the demand 
for electricity and diversifying the sources of energy supply, while also draft-
ing power system reform plans and strengthening standards and regulations in 
the nuclear sector (Duffield 2016). The GOJ swiftly passed a law on renewable 
energies, introducing a feed-in tariff in order to promote the spread of private 
and mass systems of power supply generated by renewable sources (METI 
2012, Samuels 2013). On top of this, one year after the 3/11 events, Tokyo 
put out an energy and environmental strategy based on the idea of a nuclear- 
free society (gempatsu ni izon shinai shakai; Committee for Energy and En-
vironment 2012).
These moves aimed to respond somehow to the growing public distrust 
toward nuclear energy (Kitada 2013). Against this background, the govern-
ment turned to experts for policy advice. For example, another renowned en-
ergy intellectual, former President of the University of Tokyo and chairman of 
the Mitsubishi Research Institute Komiyama Hiroshi, came to the fore urging 
the cabinet to accelerate the adoption of a new national energy strategy based 
on energy conservation. At a hearing with the House of Representatives (HOR) 
Special Committee on Science, Technology and Innovation, Komiyama main-
tained the need to “use” the earthquake- and tsunami-stricken areas as spaces 
to carry out “social experiments” in terms of the application of technological 
innovations that might eventually help Japan move from a 20th-century model 
of industrial and social arrangements (increased production through an in-
creased energy supply) to a 21st-century one (based on green innovation, smart 
technology for maximum energy efficiency, tourism and service sector devel-
opment). According to Komiyama, who shortly after the 3/11 disaster was 
appointed president of the Miyagi prefectural assembly for disaster recovery, 
the key to the region’s recovery and to Japan’s “re-creation” (saisōzō) is in-
vestment in broadband connectivity and ICT-technologies – the foundations 
of the smart communities envisioned by the government – in a fiscally deregu-
lated environment, i.e., through the identification of recovery special zones 
(fukkō tokku) where local governments take the lead.
More specifically, in drafting his vision for the year 2050, Komiyama de-
picts a country that through energy saving and resource recycling is able to 
become fully self-sufficient (shigen jikyū kokka) and lead the world in a global 
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energy transition (HOR 2011). Even though he did not touch upon the topic 
during the hearing with the HOR Special Committee, Komiyama believes that 
Japan has the capability if not to lead the world, then at least to become Asia’s 
intellectual and technological leader in the 21st century. In his 2011 book 
Japan’s Re-creation, much in the same vein as Kashiwagi, Komiyama states 
that Japan has the advantage of being confronted with issues such as a scarcity 
of natural resources, environmental decay and an ageing society in advance of 
other emerging Asian countries. Technologies and know-how developed in 
Japan can be utilised to solve such issues and eventually be exported to neigh-
bouring countries and peoples when needed. This might be Japan’s greatest 
contribution to the history of humankind (Komiyama 2011).
In this context, the debate on Japan’s energy and environment plans ex-
panded to include businesspeople and local administrators. In particular, a 
few weeks after the disaster, a bloc of renewable-supporting entrepreneurs led 
by Softbank founder and CEO Son Masayoshi, backed by a number of prefec-
tural and municipal leaders, emerged and attracted national attention. On the 
one hand, local politicians, such as Kanagawa governor Kuroiwa Yūji, started 
pushing an agenda for renewable sources based on local energy autonomy and 
cashed in on public distrust against regional energy utilities and the national 
government (Kuroiwa 2013). On the other hand, Son successfully vouched for 
state measures aimed at favouring the development of photovoltaic power 
generation through government subsidies15 and started envisioning his own 
technonationalistic view, well exemplified by the idea of an “Asian super grid” 
(Japan Renewable Energy Foundation 2012). This is the name that the tele-
communications entrepreneur gives to a multinational energy supply network 
through which Japan could buy energy generated in comparatively larger quan-
tity and at a lower price in Mongolia or any other country in the region, and 
sell domestically generated renewable energy abroad: 
[The Asian super grid] would connect many countries in Asia through cables and pro-
mote the exchange of power generated from natural sources. If we manage to build it, 
we would solve problems such as the high generation costs, limitations to supply and 
instability. [...] It implies producing energy from natural resources across Asia, and 
sharing it according to each country’s needs using a continental power network [...] 
Possibly, even in Japan in the near future, we will develop magnificent solar power 
technology and will be able to supply it at a low cost and in great quantity. We could 
sell this energy to other Asian countries, thus transforming Japan into an energy-ex-
porting nation. (Japan Renewable Energy Foundation 2012: 20–22)
Even though Son presents his vision as a win-win strategy, Japan would be the 
greatest beneficiary, for it would definitively renounce nuclear power and would 
15 The GOJ was receptive and a year later approved a feed-in-tariff scheme aimed at favouring the distri-
bution of renewable-generated energy, in particular solar, in the national grid (METI 2012, Samuels 2013). 
Also, the GOJ drafted an energy and environmental policy based on the idea of a nuclear-free society 
(gempatsu ni izon shinai shakai; Committee for Energy and Environment 2012). 
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take the lead of the project, giving Asian countries the chance to become ener-
gy exporters. 
Embedded in this plan is a sort of “reification” of Asia, viewed as a land of 
infinite opportunities and resources, and at the same time, a hierarchical vi-
sion of the system of international relations in the region with Japan at the top 
(Tamaki 2015). However, as discussed above, such an understanding of Japan’s 
position is not uncommon among other energy intellectuals and, as it will be 
shown, still somewhat informs the GOJ’s approach to international coopera-
tion in the smart-city technology sector. 
7. Energy and environment policies  
    under the second Abe cabinet
The DPJ’s ambitious “zero nuclear by 2030” policy, launched in the aftermath 
of the March 2011 disaster, was scrapped upon the return to power of the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the current Japanese Prime Minister Abe 
Shinzō. However, the new conservative cabinet did not abandon the idea that 
new energy and environmental technology could contribute to the country’s 
national and local economic recovery. In addition, it is worth noting how the 
government has successfully integrated revisionist views on energy and the 
economy, such as those of Kashiwagi and Komiyama, into its official policies.
In fact, while proposing a gradual return to nuclear energy, in 2014 the 
Abe cabinet adopted a new Strategic Energy Plan based on the concept of an 
energy mix, a combination of traditional energy sources (including nuclear) 
and renewables.16 Even though the paper did not set any specific long-term 
targets for the contribution of each type of energy source in the energy mix 
(Duffield 2016), the GOJ’s plan to trigger economic growth in peripheral re-
gions by increasing the ratio of power generated through sustainable sources 
was clear. Furthermore, in the third paragraph, section 2, of the document, the 
GOJ reaffirmed the importance of establishing an “advanced energy-saving 
society and smart and flexible consumer activities” (tettei shita shōenerugī 
shakai no jitsugen to, smāto de jūnanna shōhi katsudō no jitsugen) promoting 
the use of high-performance insulation materials for heat conservation in the 
construction sector; power-efficient lighting equipment, electric appliances 
and cars; and the introduction of energy management systems for businesses. 
The 2014 strategy stresses the importance of a smart energy supply (based on 
16 The strategy officially reinstated Japan’s nuclear energy policy. The restart of idled reactors could be 
allowed only after safety inspections by the Nuclear Regulation Authority. In 2015, the GOJ finally set 
targets for the nuclear share of energy production to be 20 percent of the total (that is, pre-3/11 levels), as 
against 22 for renewables.
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actual demand) and set specific targets (such as the 100% switch to LED light-
ing and an increase by 50%–70% of next-generation vehicles by 2030). 
Earlier in 2013, the Cabinet Council for Science Technology and Innova-
tion, chaired by PM Abe, had expressed the intention to make the draft of a 
new national plan for environment and energy technologies one of the GOJ’s 
top priorities and to make it an integral part of the country’s continual diplo-
matic efforts (CO 2013). In order to do so, the council had to take on a lead-
ership and coordination role in two state programmes aimed at promoting 
strategic scientific and technological innovation: the Cross-ministerial Strategic 
Innovation Promotion Program (SIP) and the Impulsing Paradigm Change 
through Disruptive Technologies Program (ImPACT). Particularly, the SIP 
aims at answering “critical social needs” and “offering competitive advantage 
to Japanese industry” by facilitating coordinated research and development 
activities among government, enterprises and universities. It operates under a 
50-billion-yen budget (2017) and has launched 23 issue-based programmes,17 
including innovative combustion technology, next-generation power electron-
ics, automatic driving systems, infrastructure maintenance, the enhancement 
of societal resiliency against natural disasters, big data and cyberspace technol-
ogies, cybersecurity, technologies for next-generation smart agriculture and 
energy systems toward decarbonisation.18 Programme directors are chosen from 
both academia and industry. Specifically, the decarbonisation programme is di-
rected by Kashi wagi Takao, whose “radical” positions on power generation 
have gained popu larity since the late 2000s.
The METI-sponsored smart community development and energy conserva-
tion plans launched under the DPJ were not shelved. On the contrary, while 
insisting on the role of nuclear energy in the best energy mix, the LDP-led gov-
ernment chose to “maximise opportunities” in the green and smart technologies 
sector.19 To this end, the Abe cabinet in coordination with the Keidanren de-
cided to accelerate the “smart communities” initiatives initiated prior to March 
2011. Proof of this acceleration is the rise in ministerial budgets and govern-
ment expenditures in this sector over the last eight years. For example, METI’s 
budget requests to support energy efficiency and conservation initiatives 
(through the development of new technologies for hydrogen utilisation) have 
grown steadily from 2014 to 2019. They amounted to nearly 243 billion yen 
in 2015, 323.4 billion in 2018 and 501.5 billion for 2020 (DeWit 2015).20 
17 11 in the first 2014–18 period, 12 since 2018
18 An exhaustive list of the issues is available in English on the Cabinet Office website, https://www8.cao.
go.jp/cstp/panhu/sip_english/sip_en.html (accessed 25 September 2019).
19 DeWit 2014, 2015, 2018; Samuels 2013:
20 In particular, DeWit (2014) points out that Tokyo Institute Technology Professor and government ad-
visor Kashiwagi Takao has been one of the key figures in this transition. Kashiwagi is in fact the designer of 
the first Japanese “smart community” presented at the Aichi world fair in 2005. For an exhaustive descrip-
tion of Kashiwagi’s role in the draft of Japan’s energy and growth policies see DeWit 2014 and 2018.
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Thus, as was the case for the nuclear sector in the previous two decades, the 
GOJ aims at developing a domestic economy of scale centred on defined “green 
energy” technologies and eventually meeting demand from overseas (Berndt 
2018: 144). To foster growth in external demand is the task of both the METI 
and the MOFA, whose role will be discussed in the following section. 
8. Smart cities as a tool of foreign policy 
As illustrated above, the 3/11 events accelerated the articulation of new energy 
distribution and use models by the Japanese government for domestic purposes. 
Japan’s commitment to the UN Sustainable Development Goals and the 2015 
Paris Accord21 while promoting the adoption of Japanese technologies abroad 
provided the background to the enhancement of GOJ’s outbound public-private 
coordinated initiative on the smart city.22 
In his address at the COP21 in Paris in 2015, Japanese PM Abe put for-
ward his cabinet’s priorities for complying with the agreement. Preference would 
be given to initiatives designed to strengthen developing countries’ resilience 
to climate change and to provide a good quality of life for their people. For 
instance: 
We will bring Africa clean power using geothermal energy from the centre of the earth. 
We will bring light to those areas left out of power networks. We will pass down the 
lessons learnt by Japanese cities to developing countries in Asia where cities are expe-
riencing a rapid growth of their populations. We will make sure that the peoples of the 
island countries in the Pacific can take refuge hours before a typhoon hits, providing 
early warning equipment and know-how. These are all sectors where Japanese enter-
prises have developed the best solutions after years of efforts. We will always be there 
to help whoever needs it. (PMO 2015)
This quote exemplifies the willingness of the GOJ to offer assistance to devel-
oping countries struggling to mitigate the effects of climate change by sharing 
Japan’s “experience” and state-of-the-art technologies. It also reveals the 
GOJ’s ambition to become a regional and global intellectual and technological 
leader as also argued by energy intellectuals such as Kashiwagi, Koyama and 
Son. In other words, this quote signals the existence of a shared “storyline” 
21 Member countries agreed to contain global warming within the 2oC threshold.
22 The private sector has been particularly responsive to this transition at the level of public discourse. 
Sumitomo Corporation, one of the largest Japanese trading companies, was among the actors that saw a 
business opportunity in the export of smart city technologies. In light of traumatic natural events such as 
the 2011 Japan earthquake and tsunami, as well as the emergence of global issues such as the constant in-
crease in the global population, the uncontrolled growth of cities, ageing, the use of natural resources and 
so forth, in his 2012 inaugural address former Sumitomo president Katō Susumu encouraged his employees 
to work for “the realisation of the smart city toward a recycle-oriented society” and “the establishment of 
a new lifestyle in accordance with the ageing of many societies around the globe” in response to the “new 
needs” that societies around the globe will experience in the future (Katō 2012).
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concerning the role that Japan must assume in order to help to solve global 
issues.
A key public actor in this process has been the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
After its 2006 comprehensive reorganisation, the Japanese government opened 
a Climate Change Division within the International Cooperation Bureau in 
order to foster better cooperation with other ministries in charge of energy 
and environmental issues, specifically the METI and the Ministry of Environ-
ment. In September 2015, the Ministry appointed a ministerial advisor to sup-
port MOFA’s activities in “science and technology diplomacy”, signalling the 
growing importance of this sector to the country’s international cooperation 
efforts. Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio nominated materials engineer and 
University of Tokyo Professor Kishi Teruo for the post. Kishi is another pre- 
eminent member of the Strategic Innovation Promotion Program, in charge of 
two programmes: Structural Materials for Innovation and Materials Integra-
tion for revolutionary design system of structural materials. In his function as 
scientific advisor to the FM, in addition to organising conferences and study 
groups with scientists and experts of all fields, Kishi took part in several inter-
national summits contributing to ministry network-building activities. He 
also helped to draft strategy papers, such as a “roadmap” on technological 
innovation for SDG achievement later adopted at the 2017 G20 summit meet-
ing in Osaka (MOFA 2019a).
Figure 1: Distribution of Bilateral ODA by Sector, in per cent (2013 vs 2017)
Source: Compiled by author based on data from MOFA 2014a and 2018a
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In particular, the promotion of smart-city solutions to ODA recipient coun-
tries has intensified. This development can be traced by studying Japan’s ODA 
disbursements before and after 2015. In 2013, 40% of the total outlay of 17.3 
billion dollars in bilateral aid was allocated to economic infrastructure and 
services (comprising energy and transportation) and 10% to multi-sector aid 
(i.e., environmental protection). In 2017, the ratio was up in both sectors, by 
51% and 15%, respectively.
One of the tasks of the ministry is to contribute to the country’s national 
secur ity (and specifically energy security) by gathering information from across 
the globe, using its network of embassies and Japan International Coopera-
tion Agency (JICA) branches. Its initiatives in the energy sector constitute the 
so-called “energy diplomacy” (enerugī gaikō; MOFA 2019b). Japan’s foreign 
ministry acts in accordance with the national energy strategy, summarised in 
the expression 3E+S, i.e., Energy Security, Energy Efficiency, Environment, 
plus Safety. The MOFA undertakings are, however, concentrated on the con-
tribution to the UN-led global effort against climate change and on support 
for the improvement of global access to energy. According to a 2019 pamphlet, 
between 2013 and 2017, the ministry invested nearly 13.5 billion dollars in 
energy-related cooperation (the largest donor among OECD countries), 3 bil-
lion of which has been in renewables (MOFA 2019: 4). Since 2017, FM Kōno 
Tarō, previously a detractor of LDP’s conservative energy policies after 3/11, 
has promoted a more comprehensive diplomatic approach to environmental 
issues. For instance, at the International Renewable Energy summit in 2018, 
Kōno specified that he was committed to making Japan a global leader in the 
global energy shift toward renewables such as solar power and to electric 
mobility thanks to the country’s advancement in battery technologies (Kōno 
2018: 2).23
As opposed to other Ministries, however, the MOFA does not have a specific 
document or a specific interpretation of smart cities. The ministry’s position 
regarding this issue emerges from a wide range of documents, such as joint 
statements, conference reports, speeches and press releases available on the 
MOFA’s website. 
Since 2011, Japan’s foreign ministry has been building a network of coopera-
tion agreements with international partners, in particular from the Eurozone 
(MOFA 2013, 2014b), Russia (MOFA 2014c) and India (MOFA 2016a) for 
the development and application of environment-friendly technologies in cities. 
Furthermore, the GOJ and its agencies (JICA and Japan External Trade Organ-
ization [JETRO], in particular) figure among the dialogue partners for the Asso-
ciation of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) regional sustainable urbanisation 
23 It is worth considering that since the aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear accident, Kōno has been one 
of the strongest supporters of renewables inside the LDP (Kōno 2010). Another resister has been absorbed 
into the hegemonic discourse.
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strategy (ASEAN 2018) and as supporters of specific smart city projects in 
continental Southeast Asia under the framework of the ASEAN Smart City 
Network (Centre for Liveable Cities 2018).24 JETRO operates in ASEAN 
countries in coordination with the United Nations Development Programme 
in order to match local governments’ demands for digital innovation with 
Japanese tech companies’ solutions in the sector. The smart-city model has in 
fact become synonymous with sustainable and resilient urban development 
and is envisaged as a solution to developing countries’ demand for infrastruc-
ture in line with achievement of the SDGs (PMO 2019: 25).
This is consistent with the ministry’s overall strategy, in particular concern-
ing international cooperation. According to the 2015 Diplomatic Bluebook, 
one of the priorities of the MOFA’s overseas actions is to foster “quality 
growth”. This expression points to a shift from a quantitative to a qualitative 
model of aid. In particular, the definition of quality growth promoted by the 
MOFA entails the concepts of “sustainability”, “harmony with the environ-
ment” and “resilience”, specifically against “shocks” such as economic crises 
and natural disasters. Moreover, it is fundamentally rooted in Japanese ex- 
perience, i.e., in the country’s postwar “miracle” (Zappa 2018: 424).
As of 2018, the GOJ through its overseas agencies such as JICA and JETRO 
contributes to and leads smart projects overseas under its numerous interna-
tional cooperation agreements. The most relevant of these are: a) the develop-
ment of a dedicated freight railway along the Delhi–Mumbai Industrial corri-
dor; b) the development of a new central railway station in Bangkok and the 
“smart”-ification of its surroundings; c) the Hanoi smart city project, involv-
ing more than 20 companies including Sumitomo Corp. and Mitsubishi Heavy, 
focused on self-driving electric mobility and energy-efficient housing and busi-
ness facilities; d) the Philippines’ smart city project in New Clark City, a 
special economic zone in the Northern Philippines, funded through the Japan 
Overseas Infrastructure Investment Corporation for Transport & Urban De-
velopment (PMO 2018).
Apart from being an attempt to differentiate Japan from emerging donors 
such as China, the ideas of “quality growth” and “quality aid” through sus-
tainability are particularly significant in the post-3/11 environment. In March 
2012, less than a year after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident, the 
MOFA, along with the METI and the Ministry of the Environment, hosted an 
international seminar on “smart community proposals for reconstructing the 
disaster-affected areas”. On that occasion, the then UN general secretary Ban 
Ki-moon sent a message promoting “sustainable energy for all”. As publicised 
24 Specifically, JICA is working with the Yangon City Development Committee in Myanmar on the con-
struction of a “pedestrian friendly” road network that will help to preserve and enhance historical build-
ings and monuments. Concurrently, JICA is working on the new Phnom Penh municipal Urban Transport 
Master Plan 2035, aimed at implementing the Cambodian capital’s public transportation service (CLC 
2018: 20, 45).
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on the MOFA website, the ultimate aim of the event was to “gather global 
wisdom in Tōhoku, and spread a new Tōhoku community model to the world” 
(MOFA 2012a). In so doing, the participants pledged to provide “solutions to 
the international community’s challenges such as realising sustainability, dis-
aster prevention and a low-carbon society”. At this international conference, 
the GOJ started envisioning a new model of sustainable and disaster-resilient 
urban development extensively relying on renewable energies, electric mobility 
and ITC infrastructure. The 3/11 incident, a man-made disaster, was reframed 
by the Japanese authorities themselves as a “lesson” whose main legacy was a 
new model of energy infrastructure and urban development.
Japan’s public efforts towards building sustainable smart cities at home and 
abroad was clear in September 2012, when at the 14th Major Economies 
Forum on Energy and Climate, along with another 15 country representatives, 
the GOJ, after presenting Japan’s achievements in smart city development and 
renewable energy use, pledged to continue acting towards the mitigation of 
the effects of climate change (MOFA 2012b). One month later, the MOFA, 
through the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), was among the 
participants in the 1st Asia Smart City Conference in Yokohama, an event that 
saw the participation of mayors and representatives from cities in developing 
Asia and international organisations engaged in a discussion of the technol- 
ogies and know-how to build low-carbon sustainable cities. The event was 
also designed as a showcase for Yokohama’s (one of METI’s model “smart com-
munities”) cutting-edge initiatives and best practices (City of Yokohama 2012). 
Subsequent editions of the conference saw a more direct involvement of the 
MOFA. In his keynote address at the 3rd edition of the event in 2014, Nakane 
Kazuyuki, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, hoped 
for more cooperation between the central government, local authorities and 
private companies to share experiences and know-how with partner countries, 
particularly from Asia, in order to foster more sustainable urban development 
in the region (MOFA 2014e). At the 5th edition of the conference in 2016, 
Odawara Kiyoshi, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
reaffirmed the MOFA’s support for local governments and enterprises contrib-
uting to the development of smart cities across Asia (MOFA 2016).  
The most relevant MOFA-led initiative in smart-city diplomacy is, how- 
ever, the “city tour”. Stressing the importance of exporting a smart-city model 
to developing Asia, in December 2014, the MOFA organised a tour of another 
model smart community, Kashiwa no ha (in Kashiwa City, Chiba Prefecture) 
for a group of Southeast Asian ambassadors to Japan. This tour was intended 
to present to the diplomatic community in Japan how Japan’s public and pri-
vate sectors had “united” (kanmin ittai) in environment-friendly and low-car-
bon-emission urban design. At the same time the tour aimed to promote inter-
action between foreign dignitaries and representatives of Japanese construction 
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and real-estate companies. The event was realised in cooperation with Mitsui 
Fudōsan, Shimizu Corporation and Mitsubishi Estate. In particular, the visit 
to the Kashiwa no ha smart city is worth analysing, as the urban project is 
presented as being focused on environmental sustainability (kankyō kyōsei), 
health care for longevity (kenkō chōju), the creation of new industries (shin 
sangyō sōzō) and civic participation (MOFA 2014d). Since 2013, in fact, 
Kashiwa no ha has served as the main exhibition site of made-in-Japan solu-
tions for smart-city technology. Here, the MOFA in collaboration with the 
real-estate branch of the Mitsui conglomerate and the Agency has organised 
annual presentations to the entire diplomatic corps aimed at circulating mod-
els of cutting-edge urban technologies realised through the cooperation be-
tween private and public actors both within and outside of Japan, and foster-
ing awareness of the application of ICT to urban development. The first such 
event in 2013 was hosted inside the smart city and its programme involved a 
visit to the Kashiwa no ha Smart City Museum, where diplomats were in-
structed on Japanese smart-city initiatives with the support of virtual reality 
applications. 
In addition to smart cities, since 2014, the “city tour” programme has also 
served to showcase events in high-tech infrastructure and ICT-based construc-
tion and manufacturing projects for the diplomatic community in Tokyo, with 
particular attention to South Asian, Southeast Asian and African diplomats. 
The initiative’s main aim has been to promote “high-quality infrastructure” 
(shitsu no takai infura) among the representatives of Japan’s ODA recipient 
countries (MOFA 2016b, MOFA 2018b). Apart from their declared diplomat-
ic objectives, these showcasing events are emblematic of the “All Japan” ap-
proach – that is, uniting the efforts of the national government, businesses and 
local governments, with development assistance sponsored by government 
and LDP officials (MOFA 2014d, PMO 2018).25
9. Summary
This paper has analysed the emergence of a Japanese narrative against the 
backdrop of a global discourse on smart cities since the late 2000s. The main 
theoretical assumption of this paper, inspired in particular by Jessop and Sum 
(2006, 2013), is that the articulation of a specific narrative coincides with a 
specific juncture (or disjuncture) in the real world. In particular we have ana-
25 It is worth noting that the expression “All Japan” is found in diverse circumstances. In documents is-
sued by the LDP, it is associated with the word taisei (“system, approach”) and describes a nation-wide 
network that needs to be “strengthened” in preparation for international events (such as the 2020 Tokyo 
Olympics), or in implementing energy, information and economic development and recovery strategies. See 
for instance LDP 2016, PMO 2018.
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lysed the emergence of a specific discourse coalition revolving around the idea 
of a technological nation that, having gone through a traumatic event such as 
the 3/11 disaster, has the duty to solve global issues by providing material aid 
and knowledge to developing countries. 
The first half of the paper has shed light on the building of a Japanese nar-
rative on the smart city in light of global discursive developments. The largely 
technocratic approach and the insistence on concepts such as efficiency are 
revealing of the inclusion of a corporate approach to city management. Fol-
lowing Hollands (2015), it is possible to argue that the 2007–2008 financial 
crisis that originated in the US and spread to Western Europe has contributed 
to reshaping the global imagery of urban settlements. Recent developments in 
ICTs, in particular, have laid the foundations for a greater application of these 
technologies and for their valorisation as drivers of next-generation cities. 
This is a story-line around which discourse coalitions (mostly formed by gov-
ernment institutions and multinational tech companies’ executives) have 
emerged at a global level, and the emergence of a smart city narrative in Japan 
cannot be detached from these global trends. Nevertheless, if on the one hand 
the Japanese discourse on smart cities is structured around key concepts such 
as “sustainability”, “efficiency” and quality of life, on the other hand, in light 
of the March 2011 earthquake, tsunami and Fukushima nuclear accident, it 
has assumed distinctive features. 
First, as noted by DeWit (2014, 2015 and 2018) and arising from the dis-
cussions by energy-policy intellectuals of the late 2000s, the Japanese smart-
city model is primarily centred on energy supply and consumption aimed at 
reducing the carbon footprint, rather than, for instance, crime prevention. 
This approach is clear in official energy policies adopted before and after 2011 
and is tied to Japanese policymakers’ continual efforts to find ways to secure 
the country’s energy supply in the event of massive disruptions due to natural 
disasters or geopolitical events. 
Second, when considered as a diplomatic tool, the smart city carries in it-
self traces of technological nationalism. In other words, the smart city is often 
no more than an occasion for showcasing technologies designed and/or manu-
factured in Japan that might help to advance the GOJ’s foreign policy objec-
tives, namely, advancing Japan’s national interests (i.e., supporting Japanese 
companies abroad) and showing Japan’s commitment to the international 
community’s targets in terms of development and mitigation of the effects of 
climate change on human society. Specifically, Japan’s foreign ministry is par-
ticularly keen on utilising the smart city model as an epitome of its “quality”- 
focused aid policies (centred on quality infrastructure, green technologies and 
human resource development) in opposition to other emerging actors in inter-
national cooperation (i.e., China) who are approaching developing countries. 
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In this, the convergence of state and private interests is particularly evident 
and elucidatory of the “distributional coalition” identified by Berndt (2018). 
Lastly, the analysis has shown the general lack of consideration of social 
issues (such as poverty or social inequality) among all actors involved in nar-
rative articulation when presenting the idea of the smart city. The “techno-
cratic” approach is apparent, both domestically and in overseas projects. 
Despite their possible positive outcomes in reducing Japan’s carbon footprint 
through efficient energy and space utilisation (DeWit 2013, 2015; OECD 2017) 
smart-city projects both on the Japanese archipelago and abroad are mostly 
top-down initiatives at the intersection of government, universities and indus-
try interests. In fact, many calls for a more inclusive approach toward citizen 
groups, NGOs, local shop owners and so forth, right from the project design 
phase, have been repeated in recent years (see DeWit 2013 and in particular 
EY 2014). However, further research is needed to determine whether and how 
bottom-up counter-narratives on the smart city have been integrated or rejected 
in the evolution of the dominant narrative projected by the GOJ and Japanese 
tech companies. The absence of clear preoccupations with the social aspect of 
any urban projects is all the more noticeable in light of growing public con-
cern about these issues and reports by international organisations stressing the 
increase in relative poverty (16 percent) and inequality (0.330 percent, above 
the 0.309 OECD average) in Japan in the last three decades (see OECD Eco-
nomic Survey of 2012 in OECD 2017).
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